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Pacified Inclusion: Digital Inclusion in Brazil's Most Violent Favelas

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ABSTRACT

Starting in 2008, the city of Rio de Janeiro began to "pacify" its gang-ridden favelas and invest billions of dollars in economic development. Pacified favelas became more integrated within the broader Brazilian political system while innocent bystanders fell victim to daily police-trafficker shootouts. During this time, digital technology became a ubiquitous tool for favela activists who sought to critique pacification policy as a reproduction of structural inequalities. The discussion of violence helped to form a network between online favela activists and powerful institutions in the Brazilian state. This network embraced participatory politics in the form of Paulo Freire's ideas of "critical pedagogy" as well as state-aligned ideas of entrepreneurship and economic formalization. The friction between state- and community-oriented goals in Rio's favelas demonstrates that structural violence is an essential aspect of how communities experience digital inclusion.

INTRODUCTION

In 2010, the Brazilian military and state police removed a decades-old parallel state controlled by imperialistic drug gangs and "pacified" the Complexo do Alemão, one of Rio de Janeiro's most violent favelas. Through the use of online social networks, favela activists critiqued, networked with, and worked alongside newly established state institutions. Notably, these

activists embraced locally produced digital imagery that depicted police abuse, gang violence, and state neglect. These same networks encouraged digital inclusion projects that trained locals in a critical form of digital literacy. Community policing policies and citizen journalism interacted to help construct a new type of Brazilian state and citizen within the favela. I suggest that favela residents constructed a unique form of *pacified citizenship* through the simultaneous embrace and critique of authoritative institutions. This conflict demonstrates how everyday violence becomes a vital element of digital inclusion in marginalized urban communities.

Pacified Citizenship: "If You Catch a Bullet, I Won't Rescue You"

By July 2015, Complexo residents understood that it would be the deadliest year since pacification in 2010. The police had already killed fifteen locals while losing two within their own ranks. On a Saturday night in late July, 7,000 residents filled a venue for an annual winter festival. A flatbed full of speakers blasted the locally popular funk music. Police feared that the local gang had assembled nearby in order to sell drugs or, worse, target police in a revenge attack. Police silenced the music, which had often been accused by more traditional parts of society as offering an apology or excuse for drug trafficking. Officers pointed automatic rifles at a crowd that included the elderly and young children. Beto—a 20-something self-fashioned activist from the Complexo—jumped off a stage and walked nervously towards the police. His childhood friend and colleague, Bruninho, followed a half step behind. Beto held his hands in front of him and begged for restraint. An officer warned the two: "If you catch a bullet, I won't rescue you." A few moments later, police cleared the venue.

Over the next five days, the police killed three people in the Complexo. The Monday following the festival, Bruninho returned to his job at Rio's city hall and Beto carried out interviews for his Complexo-based newspaper. Photographs and videos of the festival had circulated online for over 24 hours and the Complexo's dense alleyways echoed with alarm for those involved. Beto began a 900-word Facebook post with, "I think that all of you should be startled by the wait for this post." As a community journalist, Beto was known among activists for his online critique of pacification, mainstream media, and government corruption. He had been featured in a *New York Times* article and his newspaper had received funding from media conglomerates, multinational corporations, and the municipal government.

He represented a novel yet essential form of institutional engagement within the favela that was made possible through his use of digital mediums. Like many of their colleagues in the favela, Beto and Bruninho began their careers as *educados* (students, or, more literary, the educated) in government-funded projects that focused on digital photography. They later became *educadores* (educators) for projects that encouraged people of all ages, but mostly youth, in the Complexo to translate the structural violence that they witnessed and experienced through the use of digital mediums. Digital technology encouraged a transformative form of citizenship that challenged socio-economic and political marginalization while seeking inclusion within Brazil's plural democracy.

QUESTIONS AND OUTLINE

This article asks three central questions. First, *how is digital technology utilized under conditions of structural violence?* The Complexo is a unique ethnographic space principally defined by post-colonial urban exclusion. Inspired by the liberation theologian Paulo Freire's critical pedagogy (1970/1993), favela residents are taught to "read"—to learn the technical aspects of digital or traditional literacy but also to "read the world" by critically examining forms of authority. Second, *how can critics of violence form networks with dominant state institutions?* Institutional incursion by the state influences the practices and priorities of favela residents through technological collaborations that follow the form of information-driven network societies discussed by Manual Castells (1996) and modify a form of "insurgent citizenship" described by James Holston (2008). Finally, *what are the limitations of digital inclusion projects?* I focus on ethnographic concerns relating to plurality and cultural authority. Problematically, although these networks promote non-hierarchical ideals, local activists depend on outside institutions that have only brief economic or political ambitions in the community.

ONLINE ETHNOGRPAHY OF AN URBAN SPACE

I lived and conducted ethnographic research for two years (2014–2015) in the Complexo do Alemão. I interviewed over 150 activists and residents

with questions focusing on individual institutional affiliations, personal histories relating to structural violence, philosophies concerning technology, and interpretation of the pacification policy in the favela. I recorded over one thousand hours of classroom observation of digital inclusion projects and volunteered for twenty hours a week over the course of a year at a multinational digital inclusion NGO based in Rio. I analyzed and archived social networking content of several dozen digital online-activists from the Complexo and attended the events (i.e., workshops, meetings, and frequent protests) that these groups organized.

Stephen Graham (2004) argues that the Internet has become a banal cultural object with an assumed set of globally recognized functions. This banality opposes a more utopic view of "cyberspace" that envisions an alternative social space remote from everyday life. Scholars have discussed how both banality (Mbembe 1992) and utopia (Jameson 1979) should be seen as suspect because they subtly reassert dominant authority. The case of the Complexo demonstrates that digital technology is physically embedded in a moral, political, and cultural context in which users evoke unique forms of learning and community (Hine 2015). My ethnographic method follows scholarship that examines how "participatory modes of circulation online have an often obscured political charge that an ethnography combining online and offline sociopolitical worlds can elucidate" (Fattal 2014, 321). Online content both supports and challenges dominant ideologies, and activist engagements with powerful Brazilian institutions demonstrate a multi-sided network of allegiance. Ultimately, this paper interrogates the cultural importance of online imagery as experienced and acted upon within marginalized urban communities.

Rio de Janeiro, a modern metropolis of eight million, is an incredibly salient urban location in which to test how the Internet is engaged as a cultural object in the Global South. My research constructed an online ethnographic space of global ideas and local practices. In this space, I analyzed the embodied forms of structural violence that represented an intersection of socioeconomic, racial, and cultural inequalities prevalent in many postcolonial societies. According to Paul Farmer (2004), erasing history through censorship and silence is the predominant method for dominant actors to enforce these structural inequalities. In modern liberal democracies, dominant social actors are invested in fostering more pluralistic political dialogue. Digital technology becomes transformative

of previous social structures and fetishized as a politically neutral tool (Mazzarella 2010).

Through online networks, residents challenged various forms of censorship by re-conceptualizing ignored or silenced subjects. The Internet provided unprecedented ability to broadcast a previously "hidden transcript" (Scott 1990) that challenged hegemonic forms of discourse and subverted the prejudicial assumptions of the dominant classes. Subjects like race, violence, and poverty were not only discussed in bars and living rooms but were presented openly online. Previously observed forms of self-censorship and outright silence concerning historical inequalities by Brazil's marginalized citizens (Sherriff 2000) took novel shapes both on- and off-line. The police and politicians were common targets for on-line commentary but activists also often critiqued drug gangs, benefactors, and colleagues, although in private and with the promise of anonymity.

One informant who ran a corporately funded computer lab in the Complexo told me: "I don't say anything about other projects. It's all a *novela* (soap opera). They all want to show violence and travel abroad and visit universities, but then the political action never comes. I go on Facebook and ask people if they need help with food or school or if they need my shoulder to cry on. If I talk about a shootout, I show a picture of when they were alive, not of their blood on the street." Asked if she believed that sharing images of violence had a positive effect in the community, she responded: "Of course. Outsiders come here and take pictures of smiling children at my NGO so they can go back to their multinational and say they are doing something good. The police show pictures of dead bandits but never the innocent victims. We need to show that the favela is human."

Much of my data came from informal street-level conversations. An ethnographic intimacy "grounded" the narrative presented online. This was important not only to understand the practical mobility of content and technology but also to build trust and intimacy with my informants. Henrique, an organizer for Ocupa Alemão (Occupy Alemão), often lamented the dozens of daytime visits to the community by government investigators, university researchers, and middle-class NGO workers. Henrique passed by my home in the Complexo about once a week. I would ask him about his politically oriented Facebook posts that regularly received hundreds of "comments" and "likes". He once joked: "I have a business and my own social projects. I can't hold everyone's

hand and walk with them." He considered outsider interventions as half-hearted engagements with dubious intentions. Towards the end of my research, Henrique posted to Facebook: "I'm fed up with these alienated folks! They don't live in the favela and they want to be a doctor…give a thousand solutions to the problem. Come here and live for one month." Henrique's opinion of outsiders reflects a radical inversion of expertise and knowledge in the age of social media (Eysenbach 2008). Social media allow marginalized individuals to become culturally authoritative experts who challenge traditional knowledge hierarchies. "Reading" this marginalized expertise, one could argue, requires as much training as reading more historically authoritative sources.

INEQUALITIES IN THE COMPLEXO DO ALEMÃO

By 2014, more than 11.4 million people, or six percent of the population, lived in favelas across Brazil with Rio having more than 763 favelas housing 1.4 million. The Complexo, with over 69,000 residents and in the heart of Rio de Janeiro's metropolis, reflects one of the more severe forms of marginality associated with favelas. Dominant opinions concerning informality, race, and class helped to make the favela a marginalized space that reflected state neglect and fostered the rise of drug gangs. Pacification policy consciously engaged this history but also reproduced forms of censorship and violence that had existed before the state arrived.

Institutional authority is most visible when states impose formality on traditionally informal communities (Guyer 2004). The distinction between *o asfalto* (asphalt) and *o morro* (hill or favela), although physical, is maintained by legally sanctioned ideologies that confer formality on the former and informality on the latter. Guillermo O'Donnell (1993) makes the distinction between "blue zones," with a strong state presence that effectively normalizes legal, economic, and social activity, and "brown zones," defined by illicit markets, dominant violent non-state actors, substandard housing, and limited infrastructure. Brown zones are neglected or directly excluded from state institutions. Over the last hundred years, favelas have had various political categorizations: *gueto* (ghetto), *ilegal* (illegal), *invadida* (invaded), *informal* (informal), *não planejada* (unplanned), *marginal* (marginal), and *algomerados submornais* (subnormal agglomerates). These terms

carry varying degrees of political and social recognition, with *pacificada* (pacified) being the newest and most legitimate favela classification.

The Complexo occupies a former royal *fazenda* (ranch) that was parceled into factories after WWI. These factories later informally sold off small lots to workers who continued to divide the land until legal records became unreliable. Residents who arrived in the 1960s told me about expansive gardens and grazing livestock dotting the community's low-lying mountains. This image contrasts with the dense cluster of mismatched concrete homes that now crowd the postindustrial cityscape. Until pacification, politically connected but legally weak neighborhood associations kept a largely informal record of real estate transactions. Local businesses and employment were rarely licensed. Electricity and water were illegally siphoned from infrastructure outside of the community. Telephone, cable, and Internet providers avoided direct investment and instead relied on local proxies. During the 1990s policy makers designated large swaths of favela land as areas of environmental risk and built walls around them in order to contain community growth. Bus routes skirted the community but never entered. These informalities and risk designations can be seen today in the form of heavy-handed economic development policies and violent policing strategies.

Class in an informal community becomes the most significant obstacle to social inclusion and mobility. The vast majority of Complexo residents make less than Brazil's minimum wage (R$788 or ~US$225) (UPP Social 2014). One percent of them have a university degree, while 8 percent of the community is illiterate. Many non-trafficker men there consider themselves *trabalhadores* (workers or laborers). Almost half of the adult women in the Complexo declare themselves *donas de casa* (housewives). The majority of Rio's *empregadas* (maids) and *babás* (nannies) come from Rio's favelas, and this gendered valuation of labor sustains a sense of inferiority among Brazil's marginalized (Goldstein 2003).

The emergence of online activists, artists, and technicians represents a visible shift in the class and gender connotations of work. Alicia, a 17-year-old *orientadora* (advisor), who had already been an educada, worked for a digital videography program. She began working with NGOs within the community and preferred to go by the term *militante* (militant) instead of activist. When asked about digital technology, Alicia immediately alluded to the activist network that she took part in: "I always thought that I would leave the community, go to the asphalt. Some older guys are going

to Europe after a multinational saw a rap they did on Facebook about a shootout. So, now I know I'm going to help the community by staying here and I don't have to feel isolated, or a victim, or a poor person, because it's a favela." Alicia embraced a cosmopolitan aspiration common among activists that challenged the worker-trafficker dichotomy.

As the dominant group in Brazil, many whites utilize the concept of "racial democracy" (Twine 1998; Goldstein 1999; Htun 2004) to avoid critiques of structural racism. However, the vast majority of the Complexo self-declare as *negro* (black) or *pardo* (brown) (Barbosa et al. 2013) and understand racism as a primary form of exclusion in Brazil. Robin Sheriff notes that favela activists take a conversational but non-confrontational approach towards racism, which helps to construct individual theoretical perspectives but fails to address structural inequalities (Sheriff 2001, 127). Sheriff describes the need for a discourse "that supplies a coherent and more explicit narrative that resonates with what poor Brazilians of African descent already know" (ibid.). Activists in the Complexo discussed racial violence against blacks in other parts of the world, and they compared the media coverage of trafficking for criminals inside and outside of the favela. Through image and text, whites from the asphalt were referred to by education and class ("university students from the upper-middle class are arrested for drug trafficking"), while dark skinned favela youth were depicted simply as *bandidos* (bandits) or *traficantes* (traffickers).

Parallel States and Censorship

The lack of economic opportunities and political recognition was compounded by a rise in favela gangs. In the 25 years before pacification, imperialistic drug gangs waged inter-faction wars for pseudo-judicial and market sovereignty in Rio's favelas. Scholars dubbed these "parallel states" (Zaluar 1992; Leeds 1994; Goldstein 2003), which insulate the favela from dominant state repression and develop internal political mechanisms that respond to local needs. Drug traffickers gradually gained influence outside of the favela by running political campaigns and bribing police (Arias 2006). Outsiders commonly accuse favela residents of aiding these parallel states, but even by official estimates only 1 percent of the Complexo participated in trafficking before pacification (Salles 2010).

The most overt and violent form of censorship in the favela is the *lei do morro* (law of the hill) (Penglase 2010). Drug factions, the dominant

political and economic authority, retaliated against locals who openly spoke to journalists and police. One notable case was the death of award-winning journalist Tim Lopes. Lopes filmed a *boca* (drug distribution point) in the Complexo and presented the footage on national television. Shortly thereafter he was kidnapped by traffickers, quartered with a katana blade, and placed in a *micro-onda* (burning stack of tires) at the top of the Complexo. This story was repeated to me several times when informants discussed being cautious about whom I should talk to and what I should say. Police operations in the community typically took place after such violently dramatic events. These operations offered the only form of contact that community residents had with dominant state institutions. Fluid allegiances divided favela territory among violent non-state actors. Outsiders were seen as suspicious. There was little incentive to speak to police about drug trafficking and, without participatory mediums such as Facebook and Twitter available to share these events anonymously, outsiders became estranged from violence in the favela.

A PACIFIED COMPLEXO

More than one in ten of the world's homicides take place in Brazil (Notícias. r7 2015) and over half of those are connected to favela-based drug trafficking (Instituto Igarapé 2015). Rio de Janeiro had 4,939 homicides in 2014 of which 244 were *homocídios decorrentes de intervenção policial* (homicides due to police intervention) (Anistia.org. 2015; Globo.com 2014). The government moved to "pacify" the favelas. Pacification, more specifically, is a militarized policing strategy inspired by models in Medellín, New York, Port-au-Prince, and Baghdad to destabilize non-state armed groups (gangs and illegal police militias) while installing economic formalization programs in the community. The pacification policy implied the arrival of armed forces as well as plans for or the installation of a Unidade de Policía Pacificador (UPP), or Pacification Police Unit. The government framed pacification as a *reocupar*, a "re-occupation" of favelas, but this erroneously suggested that the Brazilian state had institutional and judicial control there. These transformations are significant only because the state institutions were previously absent in almost all practical ways. Importantly, the pacification police never set out to end violence but instead to destabilize

imperialistic drug gangs, reduce violent crimes, and introduce a new governing modality in previously excluded communities.

In the Complexo, the UPP killed 14 residents and shot 13 more (Instituto de Segurança Pública 2015). Police defensively claimed that they, too, were victims with 3 killed and 46 shot in 2014 (Casas Novas 2015). This claim could be seen as dubious given the aggressive nightly police-civilian encounters, similar to stop-and-frisk tactics in New York City, and the fact that one officer was shot in the back by friendly fire. Despite a homicide rate that fell by 65.5%, deaths linked to the UPP were more commonplace. In the opinion of residents, the police had deposed gangs as the chief state actors in the favela as well as the principle agents of violence. The UPP Social—the name was later changed to Rio+Social because of a negative association with its judicial counterpart—was established to guide billions of dollars into social programs and economic development across the city. By 2015, 37 UPP units covered 711,699 residents in 208 pacified favelas over 20 square kilometers (Rio+Social 2015).

Although civil society (e.g., NGOs, multinational corporations, and foreign governments) had invested millions in local organizations that predated pacification, pacification economically formalized the favela, increased a social safety net, and promised permanent police occupation. Real estate received legal titles and businesses required licenses and tax documents. Workers enrolled for public unemployment benefits and health care. Infrastructural investment improved roads, sanitation, electricity, and telecommunications (Gazetadopovo.com.br 2015). In the Complexo alone the federal, state, and city governments invested over a half billion dollars in infrastructure including a ~US$100 million dollar cable car network meant to provide public transportation. The UPP built seven police stations along the cable car route and placed armored storage containers that housed police outposts along major thoroughfares. The cable car formed the infrastructural backbone for UPP Social-sponsored citizenship, digital literacy, and community journalism projects.

According to my informants, the Complexo had hosted only five digital inclusion projects in the twenty years before pacification. Since pacification, the number has risen to as high as six concurrent programs and thirteen in total. Most were staffed by locals but designed and funded by outsiders. Increased investment by cable and telephone companies established (relatively) reliable Internet connections for the first time and a booming Brazilian economy

allowed many to buy inexpensive smartphones on newly available forms of credit. At least in the Complexo, digital activists supplanted neighborhood associations as intermediaries between the Complexo and Brazil's broader political apparatus. Activists critiqued these interventions with phrases like "a UPP Social é 100% maquiagem" (the UPP Social is 100% makeup).

Heavily armed gang members could still be seen in back alleys around the Complexo but they mostly stayed hidden. Censorship, prejudice, and everyday violence carried over from the parallel state structure and the lei do morro, at least in terms of traffickers, continued. Even those activists considered politically neutral were targets of retaliation because of public comments about violence. The Complexo branch of the Grupo Cultural Afro Reggae, an NGO of former drug traffickers, had been firebombed in 2013 after the group's founder expressed on Facebook that he valued the lives of police and traffickers equally. No group claimed responsibility for the bombing but, given historical forms of censorship, most assumed it to be local traffickers.

The state did not enforce a violent form of censorship but still crept close to political abuse. As antigovernment protests drew millions into the streets of Rio, the federal police investigated three local Facebook groups for their support of the protests. No one was arrested in the Complexo, but 23 "militant" educators were held without charges for several days. One woman, who found out she was being investigated after her Facebook page was listed in a newspaper article, stated: "I almost gave up. Most of my posts are about cultural events in the community. When everyone else posts images of a shootout, I usually post [a picture of] a sunset over the hill ("o morro," slang for "the community"). I end most of my Facebook posts with 'peace'."

After pacification, the police went from being agents of brief and deadly force to the dominant violent actors in the community. As representatives of a liberal democratic government, both local and outside journalists experienced unprecedented access to the community. Reporters from Brazil's largest outlets donned bulletproof vests to broadcast from inside the community several times a week. Citizen journalists sought, for the first time, to openly criticize the dominant local actors without risk of reprisal.

The Network Society and the Pacified Favela

One of my informants, Ricardo, a 40-something native of Rio's wealthy Zona Sul, had spent twenty years constructing what he called a "digital

utopia." Growing his NGO out of a nineteenth-century mansion in one of Rio's most elite neighborhoods, he shepherded millions of dollars from multinationals into hundreds of computer labs in impoverished communities and claimed to have given more than one million people access to the Internet. He also partnered with state officials in education, security, and telecommunications. His organization had carried out at least five projects in the Complexo in which many local activists had participated. In part because of the 2008 global financial crisis, Ricardo temporarily lost his corporate sponsorships and restructured the NGO towards mobile applications. By 2014, mobile technology had become the principle means by which Brazilians accessed the Internet (Sandaña 2015). In interviews with Ricardo's subordinates, most of whom were from middle- or upper-class families, some complained that the NGO was losing touch with the favela. I asked Ricardo what he thought about his subordinates' critique. He answered defiantly: "You didn't see the favela, Rio, Brazil twenty years ago. No one had access to the Internet. Maybe only the rich. We were able to bring computers to places that didn't even have water. Our biggest problem was the lack of electricity in (some of the) schools. Things have changed. The school is no longer the main problem. Even technology is not the problem. We need to find the new citizens for a digital revolution." Ricardo sought to adapt technology to favela society and hoped that marginalized society would adopt his technological revolution.

Ricardo, like most of those who espoused digital inclusion, embraced the methodologies of Paulo Freire, a Brazilian liberation theologian who was exiled during Brazil's military dictatorship (1964–1985). Freire gained recognition through teaching sugar cane cutters how to read, write, and, above all, contextualize their values within a broader society. This "critical pedagogy" (Freire [1970/1993) encouraged marginalized groups to understand what they valued, why they valued it, and how to express that value to oppressive institutions. Traditional pedagogical institutions, when made available to the poor, conferred the mere technical skills of reading and writing but did nothing to help upset forms of oppression. For Freire, there were only educators and educated as the teacher/student relationship was hierarchically exclusionary. I had frequent discussions about Freire with teachers in public schools, informal educadores, and newly "literate" educados.

When applied to digital technology, this type of critical pedagogy seeks to give not only the technical skills required to navigate the Internet but

also a socioeconomic perspective that encourages the oppressed to "read the world," organize around a set of local values, and disseminate those values in order to effect social change. Some scholars have called the content-based struggle of marginalized community's "counterpublics" (Hirschkind 2002; Warner 2002; Fattal 2014) or "recursive publics" (Kelty 2008). These publics are technologically informed subcultures with collective identities that challenge dominant social and political structures. These publics also form a "network society" (Castells 1996) in which technology subverts the traditional limitations of geography and places increased economic value on the exchange of information. The commodification of knowledge and the elimination of previously insurmountable social and physical obstacles are characteristics shared with modern liberal democracies that rely on global capital. The network society is fundamentally a state-building process through its instillation of newly inclusive economic and social values.

Digital technology develops inclusive economic practices and concepts of identity while even the most collectivist Freirian contextualization prioritizes the individual attainment of knowledge. The individual—the activist, worker, trafficker, housewife—is ultimately prioritized by digital inclusion and pacification. When I asked Ricardo about any possible conflicts between the government and his clients, he responded: "The big guys have the money and the mission. The revolution doesn't disappear because the government is involved. The militants can still have freedom, just freedom within a larger technological ecosystem."

FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF THE ACTIVIST

Much of the activism that is witnessed in the favela is a transformative form of what James Holston calls "insurgent citizenship." Economic formality, aggressive security tactics, and individual inclusion within powerful institutions allow the state to upset those forms of "insurgency" that marginalized populations have carved out. The most influential residents within the community become conducive to the state-building process through engagement with dominant institutions and discourse. Pacification subdues the militancy while redirecting it towards state-sponsored goals. The overt governmentalizing and statizing effects of pacification—through economics, real estate codification, and dramatic uses of embodied violence—are

coupled with a concerted effort to create a local civil society embedded within a dominant one.

I attended a protest for a child who had been killed by the police and spoke to a 23-year old named Marcela who lived with her parents and was planning, until only recently, to take the entrance examination for Rio's free federal university. "I'm scared. I don't want to work in a kitchen," she told me. The political party that supported a small NGO where she was employed as an educadora had lost congressional seats in a recent election and, in turn, had to defund her project. I asked her what she thought about the ambitions and sincerity of the state. She quickly shifted the topic to political activism and took a playful tone: "We're rats in the favela. Rats don't scare anyone if no one knows they exist. And when they know they exist, their first instinct isn't to feed them. We can bring the world to us with this kind of movement, make them see that we rats exist; then we could really scare them. I got the government to give me work, didn't I? They will do it again and I will bring others with me." Marcela was alluding to the negotiated nature of the state in a pacified favela. She and her colleagues formed a local node of a larger network and structure of ideologies. The Internet, and more specifically digital imagery, was connected with institutional recognition. She formed her marginalized identity, not around the kitchen, but through a set of technologies governed by a newly installed state.

The Educator and Educated

While in the classroom of *Eco-cine*, a digital inclusion project that combined ecology, digital filmmaking, and citizenship, I heard an educador ask: "Do you know the history of the favela?" He was a middle-class, university-educated Brazilian who learned about the course through political party connections. The educados, normally talkative teenagers from the favela, sat silent. The educador proceeded to ask if they had seen any movies about the favela. One named the internationally acclaimed film *Cidade de Deus*, while others made reference to popular Brazilian *novelas*. All of the examples contained violent depictions of drug culture while being geared towards an audience outside of the favela.

The educador asked if those representations were indicative of their lives. One educado chuckled: "It's completely different. I mean, it's worse than the films." The educados debated race, class, and cultural representation for the next hour. By the end of the day, the group had brainstormed the basic

premise for a short film. A month later the group was in an auditorium with a thousand people in attendance presenting a satirical short film about a youth with a hairstyle typical of the morro who was attempting to seek employment on the asfalto. The message of the film related everyday experiences of prejudice to a racialized and classed physical appearance.

After the course, most of the students planned on studying more about film and carrying out projects with their smartphone cameras. A few had already agreed to be orientadores for the next term of *Eco-cine,* promising to continue the cycle of citizenship building in the pacified favela. All of the educados expressed a desire to build a life in the community and make the community more visible to outsiders. A few months later, a student joined Beto—the activist discussed at the beginning of this article—as a volunteer at his newspaper. Others used their audiovisual skills for church, business, and independent activism. These ambitions and actions suggested the emergence of a new generation of favela residents who viewed their world in terms of technology. Most importantly, they would use technology to ask their community and the world: "Do you know the history of the favela?"

CONCLUSION

Digital inclusion has brought pluralism and accountability to the favela but in a way that is often conducive to the Brazilian state's goal of pacification. The Internet, as part of building the state in the favela, has created an intersection between pedagogical individuality and institutional involvement. Through this form of institutional recognition, residents are negotiating a pacified space and embodying a transformative form of informality. Pacification's impact is not limited to pacified favelas but extends to its citizens and other marginalized communities struggling with drug violence.

Technology and everyday violence will continue to exist alongside one another. In Rio's favelas, the UPP has become a prerequisite to any form of major government investment and many residents in non-pacified favelas express anxiety over the give-and-take of militarized economic development. Digital inclusion will remain an essential social aspect of pacification as the policy progresses and other governments adopt the policy. The UPP has spread to Rio de Janeiro state and the pacification policy is being copied throughout Brazil and Latin America. The type of pacified citizenship

discussed above can build digital bridges between marginalized communities while solidifying the formalizing goals of the state. As pacification continues as an influential means of state intervention in Latin America, researchers must continue to examine digital technology as a local mediator of structural violence.

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